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THE VIRTUE OF A PROPORTIONAL 
RESPONSE: THE UNITED STATES  





Mohammed Zayoun, a father of three children, noticed a small metal 
cylinder marked with red and white warning tape while cutting 
thyme in a field in Lebanon.  Struck with curiosity, Mohammed 
picked up the cylinder and placed it in his bag.  Later that night, 
Mohammed’s four-year-old daughter, Aya, rummaged through her 
father’s bag and found the cylinder.  Aya took the cylinder inside their 
home and gave it to her sixteen-year-old sister, Rasha, who thought it 
was a bell.  The cylinder, an unexploded submunition from a cluster 
bomb, exploded.  Rasha’s brother Qassem, and their mother, Alia, 
were both injured by shrapnel.  Rasha lost her lower leg.1 
―Cluster munitions are available for use by every combat aircraft in 
the U.S. inventory, they are integral to every Army or Marine 
maneuver element and in some cases constitute up to 50 percent of 
tactical indirect fire support.  U.S. forces simply cannot fight by 
design or by doctrine without holding out at least the possibility of 
using cluster munitions‖ – Richard Kidd, Director of the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement, United States Department of 
State.2 
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 1 See Scott Peterson, Cluster Bombs: A War’s Perilous Aftermath, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2007, at World 1, available at http://www. 
csmonitor.com/2007/0207/p01s01-wome.html. 
 2 Richard Kidd, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Weapons Removal and 
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―It should be possible to reconcile what is acceptable from a 
humanitarian point of view with what is militarily necessary and 
politically feasible in order to prevent the unacceptable humanitarian 
consequences of cluster-munition use.‖ – Jonas Gahr Store, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Norway.3 
INTRODUCTION 
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) bans the use, 
production, and trade of cluster munitions.  Cluster munitions are 
weapons that open in midair to release tens to hundreds of 
submunitions, or bomblets.  The weapon can incapacitate an entire 
convoy of military vehicles and personnel at once.  However, it also 
has proven to be inaccurate, spreading over large areas that include 
civilians.  Submunitions also tend to have a relatively high failure 
rate—often landing without detonating, thereby remaining a 
hazard for nearby and future civilian populations.  The imprecision 
of cluster munitions raises valid humanitarian concerns for its 
inability to discriminate between military personnel and civilians.  
In an effort to curtail future civilian casualties, several states 
negotiated the CCM in a series of conferences dubbed the Oslo 
Process.  On May 30, 2008, participating states endorsed a final 
draft of the CCM.  States were able to sign the CCM beginning on 
December 3, 2008. 
The United States has refused to participate in the Oslo 
Process because of military and procedural concerns.  Its chief 
objection is that cluster munitions remain an effective weapon in 
armed conflict.  The United States argues that its military strategy 
relies heavily on cluster munitions, and to remove the weapon from 
its arsenal would weaken its ability to defend itself and its allies.  
Despite this objection, the United States has acknowledged that 
current cluster munitions models create a risk to civilians and 
should be regulated.  However, it refuses to participate in the Oslo 
 
Abatement (WRA), Is There a Strategy for Responsible U.S. Engagement on 
Cluster Munitions?, Remarks at the Connect US Fund Roundtable Dialogue at the 
Aspen Institute (Apr. 28, 2008), in 30 DISAM J. INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE MGMT. 1, 
117-20 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/ Indexes/ 
v.30_3/Journal%2030-3.pdf. 
 3 Jonas Gahr Støre, Special Comment, Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR 
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM 3-4 (2006), available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2529.pdf. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/5
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Process, arguing that amending the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) is a more appropriate means of 
regulating cluster munitions. 
This article argues that the United States should adopt strict 
limitations in regards to its use of cluster munitions in lieu of 
endorsing the CCM.  The article aims to demonstrate that the 
United States would significantly weaken its military capabilities 
by endorsing the CCM in the near future, and therefore should not 
do so.  However, the United States should develop a better cluster 
munition weapon and, in the meantime, should set parameters 
regarding the use of cluster munitions to avoid violating 
international humanitarian law.  Part I provides a description of 
cluster munitions, including physical components and use in armed 
conflict.  Part II surveys the growing controversy regarding cluster 
munitions, based on international humanitarian law, which led to 
the CCM.  Part III profiles the development of the Oslo Process, 
with a focus on the terms of the CCM.  Part IV examines the 
opposition by the United States to a ban on cluster munitions and 
to the Oslo Process.  Part V concludes with a proposal that will 
decrease civilian casualties caused by United States cluster 
munitions while putting the United States on a path to endorse the 
CCM in the future. 
I.  CLUSTER MUNITIONS 
Cluster munitions open in midair and scatter a number of 
submunitions over an area that can be as large as one to five 
football fields.4  The military utility of cluster munitions lies in the 
weapon’s ability to destroy numerous targets at once.5  Once a 
submunition hits its impact point, its casing breaks apart into more 
than 300 pieces of shrapnel that can travel with enough force to 
pierce armor.6  The shrapnel escapes from the explosion at 2500 
 
 4 See, e.g., U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH: THE HUMANITARIAN 
IMPACT OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS, at 1-81, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/2008/1 (2008), available 
at http://www.unidir.org/ pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-008-D-en.pdf [hereinafter 
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT]; Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo: 
A Violation of International Law, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 42 (2002). 
 5 Mark Hiznay, Operational and Technical Aspects of Cluster Munitions, 
Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4 DISARMAMENT 
FORUM 15-25 (2006), available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2530.pdf 
 6 McDonnell, supra note 4, at 46. 
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meters per second (compared to an automatic rifle bullet that 
begins its trajectory at 750 meters per second).7  Whereas singular 
weapons are aimed at one potential target at a time, the 
submunitions in a single cluster bomb can impact multiple targets 
with ferocity at once.8  Cluster munitions constitute an ―economy of 
force‖ since they require ―fewer platforms (aircraft, artillery tubes, 
etc.) to deliver fewer munitions to attack multiple targets, thus 
reducing the logistical burden and the exposure of forces to hostile 
fire.‖9  The terms ―cluster munitions‖ and ―cluster bombs‖ are used 
interchangeably.  However, cluster munitions encompass all forms 
of delivery, including by air (cluster bomb) and ground (artillery, 
missiles, and rockets).10 
Cluster munitions have been used in combat since World War 
II, when Soviet forces dropped cluster munitions on German tanks 
and Germany dropped cluster munitions on the port of Grimsby in 
the United Kingdom.11  Cluster munitions were first used in large 
numbers by United States forces in Southeast Asia during the 
Vietnam War.12  Early phases of submunitions relied on simple 
fuses that armed according to the rate of spin of the falling 
bomblet.13  The United States estimates that military aircraft 
released up to 360 million submunitions throughout Southeast 
Asia.14 
As military strategy evolved to combat mass armored vehicle 
formations instead of mass infantry attacks, submunitions also 
evolved to include a shaped charge that could penetrate armor.15  
To ensure that submunitions landed in a correct position, militaries 
began to integrate parachute-like decelerating devices to add 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 See Hiznay, supra note 5, at 16. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4; Steve Goose, Cluster 
Munitions: Toward a Global Solution, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 
2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED CONFLICT, 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/12.htm. 
 11 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 17. 
 12 Id. at 15-16. 
 13 Id. at 16. 
 14 RAE MCGRATH, CLUSTER BOMBS: THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT 
ON CIVILIANS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS 16 (2000), available at http:// 
www.landmineaction.org/resources/Cluster_Bombs.pdf. 
 15 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 16. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/5
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stability during freefall.16  The deceleration process made the spin-
fuse device obsolete, so a new generation of submunitions included 
fuses that armed at the deployment of the parachute and set to 
detonate at impact.17  In 1991, allied forces delivered approximately 
fifty million simple-fuse and parachute-fuse submunitions in Iraq.18  
During NATO operations in Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO sorties 
dropped over 1500 cluster bombs containing almost 300,000 
submunitions.19  From 2001 to 2002 in Afghanistan, the United 
States used over 1200 cluster munitions that contained close to 
250,000 submunitions.20 
The newest generations of submunitions include guidance 
packages that correct for winds, and sensor-fuses that are designed 
to detect and destroy armored vehicles without producing a wide 
anti-personnel effect.21  Sensor-fuse submunitions typically are 
equipped with self-destruct or self-neutralizing capabilities.22  
However, even these submunitions have been reported to suffer 
from a significant number of failed explosives.23  Further, because 
of the larger size of sensor-fused submunitions, one cluster 
munition sometimes only can carry two submunitions.24  In 2003, 
the United States and United Kingdom delivered approximately 
two million parachute-fuse and sensor-fuse submunitions in Iraq.25 
Over fifteen states26 have used cluster munitions during armed 
conflicts that have occurred in at least twenty-eight countries.27  
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 16, 18. 
 19 Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate 
Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 85, 95 
(2001). 
 20 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 18. 
 21 Id. at 16-17. 
 22 Id. at 17. 
 23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLDWIDE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF CLUSTER 
MUNITIONS 4 (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/back 
grounder/arms/cluster0405/cluster0405.pdf. 
 24 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 17. 
 25 Id. at 18. 
 26 These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Israel, Morocco, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, 
United States, and the former Yugoslavia.  See Cluster Munition Coalition, The 
Problem, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-problem/ (last visited Jan. 27, 
2010). 
 27 These include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
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Thirty-three states have produced over 210 types of cluster 
munitions, while seventy states are known to stockpile the 
weapon.28  A 2004 military report revealed that the United States 
has stockpiled 5.5 million cluster munitions that include a total of 
728.5 million submunitions.29  The United States stockpile contains 
more than three submunitions for every person in the United 
States.  A troubling aspect of the global stockpile is that many of 
the submunitions are of the older generation containing simple or 
parachute-fuses, which suffer from high failure rates.30  Four 
widely stockpiled cluster munitions—the M483/M483A1 DPICM 
artillery projectiles, the M26 MLRS rocket, the Rockeye bomb, and 
the CBU-87—have reported failure rates of 14%, 23%, 18%, and 
7%, respectively.31  Of the United States’ reported 5.5 million 
stockpiled cluster munitions, 3.3 million are M483/M482A1 
munitions.  Combining reported failure rates with the current 
number of submunitions in the United States stockpile produces a 
figure of potentially 100 million failed submunitions in the United 
States arsenal.32 
II. A GROWING CALL TO BAN CLUSTER MUNITIONS 
A.  International Humanitarian Law 
Proponents for a ban on cluster munitions cite the weapon’s 
innate imprecision and high failure rate as major concerns under 
principles of humanitarian law.  International humanitarian law 
(IHL) provides the legal framework on which to base a prohibition 
on cluster munitions.  To be clear, no current international law 
 
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, 
Grenada, Iraq, Israel, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Montenegro, Saudi Arabia, 
Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Vietnam.  Id.  See 
generally MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 30-42 (presenting a descriptive survey of the 
historical usage of cluster munitions). 
 28 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 18. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 19. 
 31 Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS A FORESEEABLE HAZARD IN 
IRAQ (Mar. 18, 2003), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/es/reports/2003/03/18/cluster-munitions-foreseeable-hazard-
iraq [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ]. 
 32 See Hiznay, supra note 5, at 19; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ, supra note 31. 
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exists that specifically bans cluster munitions.33  Therefore, cluster 
munitions are regulated as a weapon in armed conflict under IHL, 
which includes the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 
(Protocol I).34  Regardless of whether a state-party has signed 
Protocol I, many of its provisions constitute customary 
international law, and therefore apply to any party in armed 
conflict.35  There are four principles set forth in Protocol I that are 
vital to appropriately applying IHL to cluster munitions.36  The 
first principle, expressed in Article 48, presents the ―rule of 
distinction‖: 
 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.37 
The second principle, expressed in Article 51,38 presents the 
―rule against indiscriminate attacks‖: 
 
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.  Indiscriminate attacks are 
a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; b) 
those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot 
be directed at a specific military objective; or c) those which 
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot 
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each 
such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.  [Indiscriminate 
attacks include] an attack by bombardment by any methods or 
means which treats as a single military objective a number of 
 
 33 Louis Maresca, Cluster Munitions: Moving Toward Specific Regulation, 
Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4 DISARMAMENT 
FORUM 28 (2006), available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ articles/pdf-art2531.pdf. 
 34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, Dec. 
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 35 Virgil Wiebe, For Whom the Little Bells Toll: Recent Judgments by 
International Tribunals on the Legality of Cluster Munitions, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 895, 
899 (2008). 
 36 See Maresca, supra note 33, at 28. 
 37 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 48; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 28. 
 38 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st 
Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 147-51 (1999) (explaining the 
indiscriminate and proportionality aspects of Article 51 of Protocol I). 
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clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, 
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of 
civilians or civilian objects.39 
The third principle, also expressed in Article 51, presents the 
―rule of proportionality‖: 
 
[It is prohibited to launch] an attack which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.40 
The fourth principle, expressed in Article 57, emphasizes the 
―rule on feasible precautions‖: 
 
In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be 
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
objects.  [All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in 
any event to minimize] incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, and damage to civilian objects.41 
Military commanders look to these principles to set parameters 
for use of force during armed conflict.42  The use of a weapon that 
violates any of the above principles violates IHL.  Unfortunately, an 
application of these principles to the practical effects of cluster 
munitions indicates that the prevalent types of submunitions and 
methods of deployment seem to violate IHL. 
B.  Design vs. Effect 
Cluster munitions are not designed to cause indiscriminate 
casualties of civilian populations.43  They are specifically designed 
to destroy entire columns of military targets with one bomb.  
However, an appropriate analysis of the application of IHL to 
 
 39 Protocol I, supra note 34, arts. 51(4), (5)(a); see also Maresca, supra note 33, 
at 28. 
 40 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51(5)(b); see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 
28. 
 41 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 57; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 29. 
 42 See MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 12. 
 43 See Goose, supra note 10 (stating that ―cluster munitions are not inherently 
indiscriminate: they can be used in such a way as to respect the legal distinction 
between military targets and civilians‖). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/5
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cluster munitions focuses on the weapon’s actual effect.  An 
assessment of cluster munitions’ legality under IHL examines the 
practical effect of the weapon as delivered during armed conflict.  
The typical characteristics of cluster munitions and the manner in 
which it has been deployed in armed conflict raise serious doubts 
about the weapon’s legality under IHL. 
1.  Absence of Aiming Mechanism 
Cluster munitions are designed to scatter submunitions over a 
wide dispersal area.44  After being released from their carrying 
mechanism, tens to hundreds of submunitions often cover an area 
of hundreds of square feet.45  This scattering effect raises concerns 
under the rules of distinction and against indiscriminate attacks, 
depending on where the cluster munitions are delivered.46  The 
rules of distinction and against indiscriminate attacks may be 
satisfied if cluster munitions are used to attack a convoy of military 
vehicles away from population centers.  However, the delivery of 
submunitions to military targets situated in or near populated 
areas may evidence the attacking party’s failure to distinguish 
between military and civilian forces.47  When a party willfully uses 
a weapon without having exercised an effective control over its aim 
or impact area, that party fails to direct warfare only at combatants 
and thereby uses the weapon in an indiscriminate manner. 
Aside from sensor-fuse submunitions, the absence of guidance 
during freefall means that the impact area of submunitions 
remains at the discretion of the aerial release point and prevailing 
winds.  The more elevated the release point and the gustier the 
wind, the greater the possibility that submunitions will fall or 
parachute away from the intended impact zone.48  Such inaccuracy 
violates the rule against indiscriminate attacks, specifically the 
prohibition against attacks that ―employ a method or means of 
 
 44 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLDWIDE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF CLUSTER 
MUNITIONS (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/ 
lib.nsf/db900sid/EVIU6BCHED/$file/Cluster_Munitions_April_2005.pdf?openelem
ent. 
 45 See Maresca, supra note 33, at 28. 
 46 Id. at 29. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See McDonnell, supra note 4, at 49. 
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combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective.‖49  
By its very structure and because of the lack of control during 
freefall, cluster munitions without sensors or guidance systems 
cannot effectively discriminate between military targets and 
civilian objects.50 
2.  Failure Rate 
An unexploded submunition creates a lasting potential for 
civilian casualties far after the official end of armed conflict.  It is 
common for a certain percentage of all munitions to fail during a 
conflict.51  However, even a small failure rate can be disastrous 
when one considers that millions of submunitions have been 
released during various armed conflicts.52  If one generously 
assumes a failure rate of 1%, a release of one million submunitions 
amounts to ten thousand unexploded bomblets.  The most 
conservative failure rate estimates a range from 2% to 5%, while 
clearance personnel report failure rates of 10% to 30%.53 
Submunitions have a relatively high failure rate, and only the 
most recent models are equipped with automatic or manual self-
destruct capabilities.  Though military contracts typically include a 
required reliability rate, the acceptability rating in some contracts 
has been as high as 5% to 12%.54  Failed submunitions act as de 
facto landmines, lying in wait for the foot of a soldier, or the hands 
of a child, to trigger its fuse.55  In Laos, for example, an estimated 
nine to twenty-five million submunitions of those dropped during 
the Vietnam War failed to explode.56  These submunitions have 
caused over 10,000 civilian casualties since the war, with the 
number rising every year.57 
 
 49 Protocol I, supra note 34, arts. 51(4), (5)(a); see also Maresca, supra note 33, 
at 29. 
 50 James G. Stewart, The UN Commission of Inquiry in Lebanon: A Legal 
Appraisal, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1039, 1056 (2007). 
 51 Maresca, supra note 33, at 27. 
 52 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 2. 
 53 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22. 
 54 Id. at 20. 
 55 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ, supra note 31; see also McDonnell, 
supra note 4, at 56. 
 56 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 17. 
 57 See id.; see also Kevin Bryant, Cluster Munitions and their Submunitions—
A Personal View, Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/5
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A variety of outside factors raise the failure rate, such as the 
age of the submunition or the delivery technique.58  The level of 
care exerted by soldiers in the storing and handling of cluster 
munitions can also impact failure rates.59  Extreme temperatures, 
hot or cold, can affect submunition performance.60  A submunition 
that lands in mud, sand, or snow has an increased likelihood of 
failure because of the soft impact.61  Falling through or getting 
caught in trees and vegetation can cause submunitions to 
decelerate and hit the ground without enough force to trigger an 
explosion.62 
The relatively high failure rate of submunitions creates 
concerns regarding the rule against indiscriminate attacks and the 
rule of proportionality.63  A known high failure rate of cluster 
munitions provides an attacking party with knowledge that 
significant numbers of submunitions will act as de facto landmines 
until contaminated areas are clear.  Even if cluster munitions are 
delivered specifically to attack a military target, the attacking 
party cannot guarantee that civilians will not, in time, pass along 
the same area and accidentally detonate failed submunitions.64  
This ―temporal‖ indiscriminate attack can be especially common if a 
military convoy is attacked on what is normally used as a public 
road or courtyard.65  Unless the attacking party intends to 
decontaminate failed submunitions, or uses only submunitions with 
self-destruct capabilities, this scenario raises concerns under 
Article 51 of Protocol I.66 
Failed submunitions and the absence of a guidance mechanism 
 
DISARMAMENT FORUM 45-49 (2006), available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2533.pdf (providing a personal account of 
the humanitarian crisis in Laos from experiences as a British soldier). 
 58 See, e.g., Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22; MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 7. 
 59 MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 6. 
 60 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22. 
 61 MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 6. 
 62 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22. 
 63 See Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51 (discussing indiscriminate attacks and 
proportionality). 
 64 See, e.g., MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 8 (arguing that a child who disturbs a 
submunition months after the bomb was dropped is ―no less a measure of the 
impact of that attack than if the child had become a casualty after just one day‖). 
 65 See Wiebe, supra note 19, at 88 (using the term ―temporally 
indiscriminate‖). 
 66 See generally id. (arguing that unexploded submunitions are de facto 
landmines and are therefore ―indiscriminate killers‖). 
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on most models combine to raise concerns regarding the rule of 
proportionality, which prohibits an attack that causes excessive 
civilian casualties or damage in proportion to the desired military 
goal.67  The past impact on civilians from errant submunitions and 
over the course of time from unexploded submunitions exhibits a 
formidable risk of excessive civilian casualties whenever cluster 
munitions are used.68  This potential for excessive casualties 
dictates that only vital military goals should proportionally 
outweigh the risk inherent in the use of cluster munitions. 
Lastly, the rule on feasible precautions requires conflicting 
parties to minimize danger to civilians from armed conflict.69  This 
rule requires parties to take all precautions necessary—from 
implementing attack strategies that spare the most civilian 
casualties, to warning civilians of impending danger—to diminish 
the collateral damage caused during armed conflict.70  When 
applied to cluster munitions, this rule dictates that the attacking 
party needs to consider and take every possible opportunity to 
ensure that submunitions cause the least possible damage to 
civilians.71  This would entail delivering the cluster munitions 
during optimal weather, at an optimal height, as far away from 
civilian centers as possible, and having a team ready to clear all 
unexploded submunitions.72  However, it is clear—evidenced by the 
ever-increasing amount of civilian casualties caused by cluster 
munitions—that warring states have neglected the rule on feasible 
precautions. 
 
 67 Maresca, supra note 33, at 29. 
 68 See supra Section I (surveying the regarding historical use of cluster 
munitions in armed conflict); see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 29 (concluding 
that ―past experience has put users on notice about the long-term dangers that 
cluster munitions cause civilians‖). 
 69 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 57; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 29. 
 70 See generally MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 12. 
 71 Michael Slackman, Israeli Bomblets Plague Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
2006, at A10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/world/middleeast/06cluster. html (citing an 
unknown military expert admitting that cluster bombs are ―legal if aimed at 
military targets and are very effective‖). 
 72 See generally Maresca, supra note 33, at 30 (discussing the variables 
associated with the use of cluster munitions). 
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C.  Impact on Civilians 
The method and quantities by which states have used cluster 
munitions have created humanitarian emergencies in almost every 
state that has experienced these weapons.  Civilians suffer 
casualties from cluster munitions from the moment the weapon is 
dropped up to years, and at times decades, thereafter. 
1.  Physical and Psychological Impact 
In regards to collecting figures on the number of casualties 
attributed to submunitions, it can be difficult to ascertain whether 
a submunition or a different type of munition—such as a landmine 
or other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—caused a victim’s 
injury.73  In many cases, the victims cannot tell what caused their 
injury, or recorded casualties do not specify between various forms 
of ERW.74  However, submunitions cause specific types of injuries 
because of the very nature of the weapon.75  Because of the outward 
release of shrapnel, victims of submunition explosions often sustain 
injuries to their upper bodies, including loss of extremities and 
sight.76  The outward release of shrapnel also tends to cause 
injuries to multiple individuals.77 
A recent study concluded that civilians, especially children, 
make up the majority of people killed from cluster bombs.78  
Research in twenty-four countries confirmed at least 11,000 
casualties, which translates to close to 100,000 casualties 
worldwide.79  The study found that over 98% of casualties caused by 
cluster munitions were civilians, while 75% of those casualties were 
due to unexploded submunitions.80  In Kosovo, Cambodia, and 
 
 73 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 10. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See generally MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 19-20 (providing a thorough 
description of bodily injuries sustained by the explosion of submunitions). 
 76 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 10 (citing RICHARD MOYES, 
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR: UNEXPLODED ORDINANCE AND POST-CONFLICT 
COMMUNITIES 7 (2002)). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Handicap International administered the study.  Richard Norton-Taylor, 
Civilians Main Cluster Bomb Victims, GUARDIAN, Nov. 3, 2006, at 24, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/nov/03/military.armstrade. 
 79 Id.  The study confirmed casualties in twenty-four countries and used a 
formula of extrapolation to calculate overall figures. Id. 
 80 Id. 
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Afghanistan, boys younger than eighteen years of age represented 
the largest casualty group.81  Children are likely to suffer the most 
casualties because the yellow coloring of the bomblets and the 
attached parachute combine to create a toy-like object. 82 
In addition, states that sustain cluster munition impacts may 
not have a healthcare infrastructure capable of effectively treating 
the medical requirements of submunition victims.  Families of the 
victims are often forced to carry the injured for miles over the 
course of several hours to the nearest medical facility.83  Even if 
healthcare is available, families may be too poor to afford medical 
treatment.84  The family of Rasha Zayoun, the girl in the opening 
vignette of this paper, was unable to afford crutches for Rasha for 
over a month after she lost her leg.85 
Aside from physical damage, populations victimized by 
submunitions suffer a severe psychological impact from their 
ordeal.  Victims of physical encounters with submunitions suffer 
from a variety of emotions, including anger, depression, and 
vulnerability.86  Adolescent victims are especially susceptible to an 
inability to develop independence or trust.87  The presence of 
unexploded submunitions also embeds a sense of terror in victims 
and the overall population.  The fear of walking in one’s community 
for fear of triggering an unexploded submunition creates a 
significant barrier to the restoration of normalcy and peace after an 
armed conflict.88 
2.  Socioeconomic Impact 
Unexploded submunitions also impact a community’s ability to 
redevelop its physical and economic infrastructure.  Before 
structural redevelopment can occur, submunitions must be cleared 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Bradley S. Klapper, Red Cross Steps Up Campaign Against Cluster 
Bombs, Urges Ban, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 6, 2006, available at WESTLAW, 
11/6/06 APALERTBUS 19:59:54. 
 83 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 11. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Peterson, supra note 1. 
 86 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Beth Sperber Richie et 
al., Resilience in Survivors of Traumatic Limb Loss, 23 DISABILITY STUDIES Q. 29, 
32, (2003)). 
 87 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 12. 
 88 Id. 
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from all public areas.  However, unexploded submunitions have 
been found in houses, schools, hospitals, farms, businesses, and 
even refugee shelters.89  Until these areas are cleared, civilians 
cannot return to work to reestablish the economy.90  Civilians may 
not even have safe access to water or other natural resources.91  
Farmers cannot sustain a livelihood or produce food for their 
communities when agricultural areas are littered with unexploded 
submunitions.92  Those desperate for income must brave the 
presence of unexploded ordnance throughout their crop and 
farmlands.93  The loss of income for many civilians reverberates 
across an economy that is likely still reeling from the presence of an 
armed conflict.94 
Unexploded submunitions also impede humanitarian personnel 
from fulfilling their mission of clearing submunitions or 
redeveloping the stricken area.  Reports suggest that personnel 
conducting clearance operations have suffered casualties in twenty-
nine states and areas.95  Prior efforts to provide food packets to 
civilians in Afghanistan have failed because civilians were unable 
to differentiate the yellow food packets from unexploded 
submunitions since they were similar in size and color.96  If the 
area is considered too dangerous, relief workers are not permitted 
to enter.97 
Poor prospects of maintaining a livelihood, along with the 
apparent danger of surrounding areas, combine to dissuade many 
civilians from returning to their homes.98  In Lebanon, the highest 
 
 89 Id. at 13. 
 90 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 60, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 2007) (explaining that the impact of cluster munitions include 
―thousands unable to return to their homes; and devastated livelihoods as fields 
are rendered unusable, harvests destroyed, and sources of income lost for a 
generation.‖). 
 91 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 14. 
 92 See MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 7. 
 93 See Slackman, supra note 71, at A10 (interviewing a farmer that claimed 
that he must harvest his olives and wheat, despite unexploded submunitions, 
because he would otherwise have no finances for the winter). 
 94 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 15. 
 95 Id. at 11. 
 96 See Elizabeth A. Neuffer, Afghan Food Drops Found to Do Little Good, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2002, at A1. 
 97 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 13-14. 
 98 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FATALLY FLAWED: CLUSTER BOMBS AND THEIR 
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rate of civilian casualties from unexploded submunitions occurred 
immediately after the conflict ended, as people returning to their 
homes without knowledge of the apparent danger of submunitions 
set off the charges.99  Since the hazard of unexploded munitions 
remains until they are entirely cleared, civilians’ lives may be 
disrupted for years or decades.  Similarly, in Laos, the remaining 
existence of unexploded munitions from the Vietnam War prevents 
schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure projects from being 
built to this day.100  In Kosovo, the areas contaminated with 
unexploded submunitions still need to be cleared even seven years 
after they were dropped.101 
D.  A Movement to Ban Cluster Munitions 
The potential for unacceptable humanitarian costs through the 
use of cluster munitions was recently displayed in the 2006 
Lebanon War.  During the last week of the 2006 Lebanon War, 
Israel released numerous cluster munitions into southern Lebanon 
apparently in response to Hezbollah’s use of over 100 cluster 
rockets.102  Israeli cluster munitions had a failure rate of close to 
70%, leaving up to one million unexploded submunitions in 
southern Lebanon.103  Figures by United Nations indicated that 
thirteen square miles—including 26% of Lebanon’s cultivatable 
land—were contaminated by unexploded submunitions.104  United 
Nations officials estimated that one million unexploded 
submunitions covered an area that inhabited roughly 650,000 
residents.105  Farmers could not harvest until United Nations teams 
cleared areas of unexploded submunitions, for fear of setting one 
off.106 
 
USE BY THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN 20 (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/HRW_fatally%20flawed%20Afghanistan.p
df. 
 99 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 32. 
 100 Id. at 14. 
 101 Id. at 15. 
 102 See Peterson, supra note 1. 
 103 See Richard Boudreaux, Israel Criticized for Cluster Bombs, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2008, at A8, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/ 01/world/fg-
cluster1; see also Peterson, supra note 1. 
 104 See Peterson, supra note 1. 
 105 See Slackman, supra note 71, at A10. 
 106 See Peterson, supra note 1. 
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Israel’s government-appointed Winograd Commission found 
that Israel’s use of cluster munitions lacked ―operational discipline, 
control and oversight.‖107  The United Nations calculated that fifty-
five demining teams would be able to clear most of the failed 
submunitions by the end of 2007—eighteen months after the 
Hezbollah-Israeli ceasefire.108  For many states that advocated for a 
ban on cluster munitions, the gross abuse of cluster munitions in 
the 2006 Lebanon War acted as a catalyst towards negotiating an 
official prohibition.109 
The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) initially 
appeared to be the best setting for discussions to regulate cluster 
munitions.  The CCW seeks to protect combatants and 
noncombatants from certain types of weapons.110  When the CCW 
entered into force in 1983, it addressed incendiary weapons, mines, 
booby-traps, and fragmentary weapons.111  The CCW has been 
amended to include Protocol V, a Protocol on Explosive Remnants 
of War.112  Though Protocol V standardizes the clearance of 
unexploded submunitions, it does not establish regulations for the 
use of cluster munitions during armed conflict.113 
 
 107 Boudreaux, supra note 103. 
 108 See Peterson, supra note 1.  The United Nations has estimated the clearing 
effort to cost $40 million. Id.  Considering that failed submunitions dropped in 
Laos over thirty years ago still kill and injure civilians to this day, clearing efforts 
are well worth the cost.  See Press Release, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Cluster 
Munitions: ICRC Calls for Urgent International Action (June 11, 2006), 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/ihl-weapon-news-
061106?OpenDocument&style=custo_print. 
 109 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 61, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 2007).  If the 2006 Lebanon War was a final straw, then the 
use of cluster munitions during the 2008 South Ossetia War surely provided 
renewed motivation for states participating in the Oslo Process.  See Russia 
Accused of Using Cluster Bombs on Civilians, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE (Geneva), Aug. 
26, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3692358 (last visited Nov. 15, 
2008).  Georgian diplomats charged that many Russian cluster munitions 
remained unexploded on roads and farms, ―resulting in civilian casualties on a 
daily basis.‖ Id. 
 110 Arms Control Association, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
(CCW) at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/CCW (last visited Nov. 
15, 2008) [hereinafter ACA,Convention]; Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and 
Winding Road Towards an Instrument on Cluster Munitions, 12 J. CONFLICT & 
SEC. L. 447, 474-75 (2007). 
 111 ACA, Convention, supra note 110. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Arms Control Association, Cluster Munitions at a Glance, 
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States advocating for a prohibition on cluster munitions 
brought their concerns to the CCW in November 2006 with a 
proposal to add Protocol VI, a Protocol on Cluster Munitions.114  
However, the CCW requires a ―negotiating mandate‖ among its 
state parties before negotiations can begin on any proposal.115  
Russia, China, and the United States objected to starting 
negotiations on cluster munitions, and the mandate was not 
achieved.116  The only consensus reached during the meeting was 
an agreement to assemble a group of experts in June 2007 to study 
the possibility of a new protocol on cluster munitions.117 
Frustrated with the slow-moving process, and the blockade on 
talks from the United States, Russia, and China, a coalition of 
treaty members led by Norway announced at the November 2006 
meeting that they would begin negotiations outside of the CCW 
process towards a ban on cluster munitions.118  Even though the 
United States dropped its objection in June 2007,119 Russia and 
China remained steadfast against starting negotiations on cluster 
munitions.120  The effort headed by Norway came to be called the 
Oslo Process. 
III. THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS 
A.  The Oslo Process 
The Oslo Process consisted of five conferences held over two 
years by various states towards the negotiation of a prohibition on 
the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions 
 
http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3125 (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) [hereinafter 
ACA, Munitions]. 
 114 See id.; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 30. 
 115 Woudenberg, supra note 110, at 475. 
 116 See ACA, Munitions, supra note 113; ACA, Convention, supra note 110. 
 117 SeeACA, Munitions, supra note 113; ACA, Convention, supra note 110. 
 118 See ACA, Munitions, supra note 113; ACA, Convention, supra note 110. 
 119 See Eliane Engeler, U.S. Ready to Negotiate on Cluster Bombs, MIL. TIMES 
(Online), June 18, 2007, available at http://www.militarytimes.com/ 
news/2007/06/ap_clusterbombs_070618/ (reporting that the United States reversed 
its objection ―due to the importance of this issue, concerns raised by other 
countries, and our own concerns about the humanitarian implications of these 
weapons‖). 
 120 ACA, Munitions, supra note 110. 
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that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.121  Forty-nine states 
attended the Oslo Conference in late February 2007 to begin 
discussions on provisions and terms.122  The Oslo Conference 
attendees pledged to complete a legally binding treaty by 2008 and 
agreed to develop an international infrastructure to facilitate care 
to victims, clearance of unexploded submunitions, destruction of 
stockpiles, and risk education.123 
The Oslo Conference—along with corresponding conferences in 
Lima (May 23-25, 2007),124 Vienna (December 5-7, 2007),125 and 
Wellington (February 18-22, 2008)126—helped to finalize the terms 
of the treaty while allowing states to continue debates regarding 
provisions that remained in dispute.  During these conferences, 
participating states debated three primary issues.  The states 
debated whether the adopted restrictions on cluster munitions 
would take effect immediately, or whether the treaty would allow a 
phasing period to give participating states the opportunity to 
develop alternative weapons.127  A second issue was whether the 
treaty would prohibit cluster munitions as a class of weapons or 
allow for exceptions regarding technologically advanced models.128  
 
 121 Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, Declaration, Feb. 22- 23, 2007, 
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-
topics/Humanitarianefforts/clusterinitiative/conference.html?id=449312 
[hereinafter Oslo Declaration]. 
 122 See ACA, Munitions, supra note 113. 
 123 See Oslo Declaration, supra note 121. See generally Addressing the 
Humanitarian Impacts of Cluster Munitions: Key Issues (Oslo Conference on 
Cluster Munitions Background Paper, 2007), available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/OsloCCM%20background%20
paper%201502.pdf (providing a concise overview of the initial objectives for 
participants of the Oslo Process).  
 124 See Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Report on the Lima Conference and 
Next Steps, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/ 
2008/05/cmc-report-on-the-lima-conference-23-25-may.pdf. 
 125 See Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Report on the Vienna Conference on 
Cluster Munitions, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/up 
loads/2008/05/report-on-the-vienna-conference-5-7-december.pdf. 
 126 See Cluster Munition Coalition, Report from the Wellington Conference on 
Cluster Munitions, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/up 
loads/2008/05/wilpf-report-on-wellington-conference-18-22-february.pdf. 
 127 ACA, Munitions, supra note 113. 
 128 Id. The debate over the proper definition of cluster munitions continued 
until at least the Wellington Conference in February 2008.  See John Duncan, U.K. 
Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, Statement to the 
Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions (Feb. 18, 2008), available at 
http://ukunarmscontrol.fco.gov.uk/resources/ 
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Lastly, member states of NATO pushed for a provision that would 
allow treaty signatories to cooperate militarily with states that 
were not treaty members.129 
While the debates lingered, over eighty states pledged to 
continue with the Oslo Process by conferencing in Dublin in May 
2008 to finalize terms to the treaty.130  By the time the Dublin 
Conference opened, the number of participating states had grown 
to 120.131 
B.  An Agreement in Dublin 
On May 28, 2008, 111 states agreed to the finalized terms on 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).132  The last lift of 
morale towards a final draft of the CCM was provided by the 
United Kingdom, which announced its intent to sign the CCM after 
having earlier withdrawn two major cluster munitions from its 
arsenal.133  States were able to sign the CCM beginning on 
December 3, 2008, and 104 states have signed by the end of 2009.134 
The terms of the CCM exhibit the limitations the treaty sets 
for the use of cluster munitions, along with the compromises 
reached by the participating states.  The CCM defines a cluster 
munition as a ―conventional munition that is designed to disperse 
or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 
 
en/pdf/5061551/postgv_cmstmt18Feb208. 
 129 See U.S. Opts Out of Landmark Cluster Bomb Treaty, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 30, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24889155/. 
 130 See Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, Declaration, Feb. 18-22, 
2008, available at http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/declaration-well-
en_001.pdf. 
 131 List of Countries Subscribing to the Declaration of the Wellington 
Conference on Cluster Munitions, May 23, 2008, available at http://www. 
mfat.govt.nz/downloads/disarmament/Well-Dec-list-of-subscribers-dijibouti 
&swazi-2305.pdf. 
 132 Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin, CCM/77, May 30, 2008, 
available at http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ ENGLISHfinaltext.pdf 
[hereinafter CCM]; see Engeler, supra note 119. 
 133 See Editorial, Cluster Bombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/opinion/01sun1.html. 
 134 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtds 
g_no=XXVI-6&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); Miles A. Pomper, 
Arms Control Ass’n, Cluster Munitions Treaty Announced (June 2008), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_06/Cluster (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
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kilograms.‖135  Notably, excluded from this definition are munitions 
that (in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks 
posed by unexploded submunitions) have all of the following 
characteristics: 
 
1. Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive 
submunitions; 
2. Each explosive submunition weighs more than four 
kilograms; 
3. Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage 
a single target object; 
4. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic 
self-destruction mechanism; [and] 
5. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic 
self-deactivating feature[.]136 
 
In essence, the CCM does not set a blanket prohibition on cluster 
munitions.  Instead, it creates a heightened sophistication standard 
for submunitions. 
The CCM also sets an eight-year deadline for member-states to 
destroy stockpiles of cluster munitions, but provides for a process of 
requesting an extension in case a state needs additional time.137  In 
accordance with the original objectives of participating states, the 
CCM provides guidelines for clearing unexploded submunitions, 
providing risk education, establishing a victim assistance program, 
and enforcing the treaty.138  The CCM does not provide a sufficient 
phasing period, as it is set to enter into force six months after thirty 
states sign and ratify the treaty.139 
Most notably, the CCM permits state parties to ―engage in 
military cooperation and operations with States not party‖ to the 
treaty, a victory for participants who are also members of NATO.140  
The CCM therefore allows parties to engage in military operations 
and peacekeeping missions with non-state parties (i.e., the United 
States) who have cluster munitions in their arsenal.  Aside from 
 
 135 CCM, supra note 132, art. 2(2). 
 136 Id. art. 2(2)(c). 
 137 Id. art. 3(2)-(4). 
 138 Id. arts. 4, 5, 8. 
 139 Id. art. 17. 
 140 CCM, supra note 132, art. 21(3). 
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the United States, other notable states—and major cluster 
munition producers—that are unlikely to endorse the CCM are 
Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Brazil.141  Article 
21 should also come as a relief to the United States—which has 
made very clear that it refuses to endorse the CCM—because it 
allows the United States to continue joint operations with many of 
its allies who intend to ratify the CCM (most notably, the United 
Kingdom). 
IV. UNITED STATES POLICY ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS 
A.  Rationale for Refusal to Endorse the CCM 
The United States’ refusal to endorse the CCM is two-fold: 
first, United States argues that the CCW, not the CCM, is the 
proper venue to establish international restrictions on weapons; 
second, it maintains that cluster munitions are essential to its 
national defense and to the defense of its allies and can be used 
within the parameters of IHL. 
The United States insists that an international negotiation on 
restrictions for cluster munitions should have occurred within the 
framework of the CCW.  It argues that the formation of a treaty 
outside of the CCW undermines the ―framework of the CCW‖ that 
has been in place for over twenty years.142  However, its principal 
argument is that the CCW has as member-states the world’s 
largest producers of cluster munitions such as Russia, China, and 
the United States.  Any meaningful and lasting agreement on the 
limitation of a weapon must logically include the participation and 
approval of major weapon producers and suppliers. 
However, history has not always shown this to be the case.  In 
1995, the CCW took on the challenge of negotiating an agreement 
for the restriction of anti-personnel landmines.143  The following 
year, an impasse occurred between states that preferred a 
conditional prohibition on landmines and states that advocated for 
 
 141 See Eamon Quinn & John F. Burns, U.K. Drops Opposition to Cluster Bomb 
Ban, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 29, 2008, at 5. 
 142 John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 501 (2007). 
 143 Wiebe, supra note 19, at 159. 
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a complete and total ban.144  The stalemate motivated several 
states to develop a landmine treaty outside of the CCW process.145  
This treaty, once entered into force, became known as the Ottawa 
Treaty.146  The Ottawa Treaty failed to have the support of the 
United States, Russia, and China.  However, since its inception, 
more than forty million landmines have been destroyed, and trade 
in the weapon has ceased.147  Moreover, the United States has paid 
more than any other country—$1.2 billion—to neutralize and clear 
landmines.148 One cannot deny that overwhelming international 
cooperation towards a treaty on a certain weapon has a ―shaming‖ 
effect for the use and trade of that weapon, regardless of the venue 
in which the treaty was created.149 
The United States also insists that cluster munitions are an 
effective weapon ―when properly targeted and employed‖ so long as 
the risk of collateral damage is considered when using these 
weapons in armed conflict.150  Cluster munitions are effective 
against an array of objects that are normally targeted during 
combat: aircraft and airfields; battle tanks and other armored 
trucks; troops; artillery; targets reported to be hidden in wooded 
areas; hidden targets that cannot be hit by precision weapons, and 
radio towers.151  The United States argues that cluster munitions 
are unique tools against dispersed and moving targets such as 
troops and armored vehicles.152  The ability of one pilot to strike 
several targets minimizes the risk of enemy fire since fewer sorties 
 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 
Dec. 3, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999). 
 147 See Editorial, Cluster Bombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at 
Wk11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/opinion/01 sun1.html. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International 
Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 836 (2007). 
 150 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS: KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
AFTER-ACTION REPORT 90 (Jan. 31 2000), available at http://web 
harvest.gov/peth04/20041027022740/www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf. 
 151 MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 8. 
 152 See, e.g., Miles A. Pomper, Arms Control Ass’n, Cluster Munitions Talks 
Gain Steam (Mar. 2008), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/ Cluster (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2010); Maj. Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster 
Munitions and the Law of War, 51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 258 (2001). 
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are necessary.153  The removal of cluster munitions from the United 
States’ arsenal would risk the lives of soldiers and coalition 
partners during armed conflict.154  Though some may argue that 
future conflicts will focus mainly on counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency efforts, the Pentagon must still be prepared to 
defend against failed states and to ―interact‖ with a strengthening 
China and a more aggressive Russia.155  Cluster munitions remain 
an integral defense against advancing armies and must remain in 
the United States’ stockpile until more reliable and technologically 
advanced cluster bombs can fill the arsenal.156  According to State 
Department officials, abandoning cluster munitions is simply not 
tenable from a military standpoint.157 
The United States disagrees with the notion that cluster 
munitions inherently violate IHL or should be uniformly banned.158  
Instead, technologically advanced cluster munitions—equipped 
with self-destruct and guidance capabilities—can significantly 
reduce the risk to civilians that raises concerns under IHL.159  
Further, military planners can ensure that cluster munitions are 
not fired in the vicinity of civilian areas.160  States can also speed 
up clearance of unexploded submunitions.161  Even domestic critics 
of cluster munitions agree that using technology to reduce the 
percentage of unexploded submunitions and using appropriate 
rules of engagement to curb the risk of errant munitions would 
render cluster munitions less likely to create a humanitarian 
crisis.162  The United States cannot endorse a general prohibition 
 
 153 Herthel, supra note 152, at 258-59. 
 154 See Engeler, supra note 119. 
 155 See Gates Approves New Defense Strategy over Objections of Service Chiefs, 
INSIDEDEFENSE.COM, June 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.afa.org/ 
GatesApproves.pdf. 
 156 See Stephen Mathias, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons, United States Intervention on Technical 
Improvements (July 15, 2008), available at http://ccwtreaty.state.gov/state 
ments/0715TechImprovements.html. 
 157 Alejandro D. Wolff, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative, U.S. Mission to 
the U.N., Statement at the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict (May 27, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
t/pm/rls/rm/105253.htm. 
 158 See Crook, supra note 142, at 501. 
 159 See Engeler, supra note 119. 
 160 Herthel, supra note 152, at 264. 
 161 Pomper, supra note 152. 
 162 See 145 CONG. REC. S10070-71 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/5
ANZALONE_MACROED[1] 4/24/2010  11:11 AM 
2010] THE U.S. AND CLUSTER MUNITIONS  207 
on an essential weapon in its arsenal when solutions exist that can 
mitigate the weapon’s negative humanitarian impact. 
B.  Mitigation of Problematic Cluster Munitions 
The United States ―recognizes the need to minimize the 
unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure associated 
with unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions.‖163  Cluster 
munitions have negatively impacted United States forces during 
military exercises.  During the 1991 conflict in Iraq, United States 
forces, while conducting a night assault on an Iraqi-occupied 
airport in Kuwait, were held back because they were unable to 
traverse terrain covered with unexploded submunitions from allied 
bombing.164  An investigation of military casualties in Operation 
Desert Storm found that ―soldiers entering . . . battlefields would 
encounter larger amounts of unexploded submunitions than 
desired.‖165  Procedural manuals from the Pentagon include a 
reminder to commanding officers to consider the potential risk of 
unexploded submunitions to soldiers as they enter an area that has 
previously been bombarded.166 
The United States is aware of the weaknesses of cluster 
munitions and has tried to diminish those weaknesses by 
developing submunitions.  During the Iraq War in 2003, the United 
States, for the first time, used combat cluster submunitions 
equipped with self-destruct capability.167  The United States also 
used a dispenser that corrected any wind interference to increase 
the accuracy of airdropped submunitions.168  Sensor-fused weapons 
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were also deployed that independently sensed, and then attacked, 
armored vehicles.169  The Air Force and Army have both reported 
on efforts to improve the reliability and guidance mechanisms in 
their respective cluster munitions.170  The interest that the United 
States shows in these new technologies is an encouraging sign that 
its military hopes to someday move away from older, imprecise, and 
indiscriminate cluster munitions. 
The United States has also taken responsibility by helping to 
decontaminate areas plagued by its unexploded submunitions.  For 
example, in 1990, the United States agreed to give $850,000 in 
prosthetic devices for Laotian victims of bombing during the 
Vietnam War.171  In 1996, the United States agreed to send 
military personnel to Laos to assist in the clearing of remaining 
unexploded submunitions.172  At the beginning of 2008, the United 
States announced plans to create a ―quick reaction force‖ that 
would be tasked with removing unexploded cluster bombs and 
other ERW from civilian areas.173  In total, the United States has 
spent close to $1 billion in clearing submunitions ―from East Asia to 
Southeast Europe to the Middle East.‖174 
The effort of the United States to achieve a balance between 
protecting humanitarian principles and its security interests was 
most recently displayed in the Pentagon’s new policy regarding 
cluster munitions.  New types of cluster munitions being developed 
by the United States will have a functioning rate of 99% or 
better.175  By June 2009, the Pentagon will begin reducing the 
number of cluster munitions in its arsenal that do not meet the new 
functioning rate requirement.176  Unfortunately, the new 
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generation of cluster munitions is not scheduled to be available 
until 2018.177 
The time and investment that the United States has committed 
towards developing cluster munitions and clearing unexploded 
submunitions exhibits a genuine desire to reduce the humanitarian 
impact of its weapons.  It will take an estimated ten years for the 
United States to begin using more reliable cluster munitions.  In 
the meantime, the United States will have to rely on its current 
problematic supply.178  However, the implementation of certain 
restrictions on the use of these cluster munitions can ensure that 
the United States upholds IHL. 
V.  STRATEGY FOR A SOLUTION 
As stated by Jonas Gahr Store, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Norway, ―[i]t should be possible to reconcile what is acceptable 
from a humanitarian point of view with what is militarily 
necessary and politically feasible in order to prevent the 
unacceptable humanitarian consequences of cluster-munition 
use.‖179 
The CCM is a valuable addition to international law and a 
product of a commendable process of international cooperation.  
However, it would not be practical for the United States to endorse 
the CCM at this time.  There is abundant proof that the United 
States’ military strategy depends on the ability to use cluster 
munitions during military operations.  Considering the position of 
the United States in the world—as a member of NATO and as the 
leading force in the global war on terrorism—weakening United 
States’ military capability is tantamount to weakening the military 
might of the Western world.  Even if there is a likelihood that 
future armed conflicts will revolve around counterterrorism 
strategies and guerilla warfare, it is practical for any state to stay 
prepared in the event that a more traditional conflict arises. 
In the meantime, the United States must continue making 
improvements to cluster munitions.  Advanced guiding systems and 
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sensor-fuses would provide the military with the ability to target 
even small submunitions to help ensure that only military targets 
are impacted when cluster munitions are used.  The Pentagon has 
the available remote technology to enable submunitions to be self-
destructible and self-deactivating, which would eliminate the 
hazard of unexploded submunitions.180 
A new generation of cluster munitions that includes this 
available guidance and remote technology will have aiming 
capabilities and a low failure rate.  In essence, this new generation 
of cluster munitions would satisfy the rules of distinction, 
proportionality, feasible precautions, and the rule against 
indiscriminate attacks.  Moreover, the addition of this technology 
would almost certainly bring the United States supply of new 
cluster munitions into the exception clause (Article 2(2)) of the 
CCM.  Embracing and utilizing this technology may open the door 
for the United States to willingly enter the CCM. 
If the United States becomes involved in armed conflict before 
its new generation of cluster munitions is available, strict 
guidelines on the use of cluster munitions can ensure that the 
United States upholds IHL.  Knowing that its current arsenal 
contains ―dumb‖ submunitions with high failure rates, the United 
States should adopt a policy that these cluster munitions would not 
be used on military targets in any vicinity of a population center.  
By limiting the use of cluster munitions to attacking military 
targets that are entirely secluded from civilians, the United States 
would uphold the principles of distinction, proportionality, feasible 
precautions, and the rule against indiscriminate attacks, even with 
a weapon with known unreliability.  To ensure, however, that 
civilians are not endangered in the long term, the United States 
should also adopt a protocol of quickly clearing unexploded 
submunitions from affected areas in an expedited fashion after a 
cease fire has been reached.  Though this may be a burdensome and 
costly process, the only other option for the United States—without 
violating IHL—is to rely solely on precision-guided weapons until 
the new generation of ―smart‖ cluster munitions is ready for use. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the United States were to sign the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, it would render useless a weapon that is a pillar of its 
current arsenal.  Rather than endorse and ratify a treaty that 
would substantially weaken its military strength, the United States 
should wait until it updates its arsenal to include a generation of 
cluster munitions that satisfy the standards of international 
humanitarian law and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.  In 
the meantime, however, the United States should refrain from the 
use of unreliable cluster munitions in any situation where there is 
a possibility that civilians may be impacted.  Following this 
guidance will prove that it is indeed possible to reconcile 
humanitarian law with the use of cluster munitions. 
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